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1 – 10 of over 17000Educators who work in K-12 educational settings have only begun to make sense of the many consequences the COVID-19 pandemic has had for students. Months of remote teaching and…
Abstract
Educators who work in K-12 educational settings have only begun to make sense of the many consequences the COVID-19 pandemic has had for students. Months of remote teaching and learning have made one thing quite clear; the academic, physical, and mental health benefits of in-person schooling are difficult to replicate through online learning. The COVID-19 pandemic has elevated the importance of social emotional learning (SEL) as children have experienced substantial reductions in social contact with peers while attending school remotely. Given the profound impact this past year has had on children’s social emotional (SE) health, it has never been more important for educators, parents, and caregivers to support student’s SE health. While it may be tempting to put student’ SE well-being on the back burner as we scramble to make up for lost learning; we stand at a crossroad. We can radically weave SEL into the school day to ensure students continue to develop critical SE skills in a socially distanced world or we can fall back on business as usual.
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This chapter examines the determinants of managerial incentives at the time of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock…
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This chapter examines the determinants of managerial incentives at the time of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange. We identify a trade-off relation between board monitoring and incentives that is specific to CEOs. We also investigate the role of stock option grants and share transactions at the IPO. We find that the IPO may be used as a wealth diversification opportunity. We report that undiversified managers with large pre-IPO shareholdings receive smaller stock options grants and sell more shares in the IPO than more diversified managers.
Outlines previous research on the role of executive compensation contracts in reducing conflicts of interest between ownership and control; and develops hypotheses on the effects…
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Outlines previous research on the role of executive compensation contracts in reducing conflicts of interest between ownership and control; and develops hypotheses on the effects of chief executive officer stock options and share ownership on subsequent firm performance. Suggests that since options do not create losses when share prices decline, they encourage more risk taking than share ownership. Explains the methodology used to test these ideas on 1994‐1996 data for a sample of large US firms and presents the results, which suggest that both stock options and share ownership are positively linked to later firm performance but that the link is stronger for ownership in high risk situations, but lower performance where risk is high. Considers the implications for corporate governance and consistency with other research; and calls for further research.
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Chandra S. Mishra and James F. Nielsen
Outlines previous research on the links between board composition, firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, and presents a study of CEO pay‐performance…
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Outlines previous research on the links between board composition, firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, and presents a study of CEO pay‐performance sensitivity, board independence and performance in the US banking industry. Explains the methodology and presents the results, suggesting that for large bank holding companies with average performance, increased board independence reduces pay‐performance sensitivity because internal monitoring is sufficient without extra alignment incentives. Adds that when performance is poor this no longer holds true and compensation contracts are then used to align the interests of managers and shareholders.
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Richard H. Fosberg and Joe F. James
Jensen and Murphy (1990) and others have found a small but statistically significant relationship between firm performance (as measured by change in shareholder wealth or firm…
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Jensen and Murphy (1990) and others have found a small but statistically significant relationship between firm performance (as measured by change in shareholder wealth or firm profits) and executive compensation. In this study we investigate the pay‐ performance relationship further by considering the relationship between an outside measure of firm performance (changes in the firm's bond rating) and the contemporaneous change in the compensation of the firm's CEO. We find that when a firm's bond rating is down‐graded, CEO total compensation declines by a relatively small amount ($165,500) and when a firm's bond rating is upgraded, CEO total compensation increases markedly ($3,202,900). Thus, while a positive pay‐performance relationship exists, the relationship is not symmetric. CEO compensation changes (increases) much more when firm performance improves than it changes (decreases) when firm performance declines. Further, most of the change in CEO compensation occurs in the stock gains (profits from the exercise of stock options) category for both firms experiencing bond rating upgrades and down‐grades.
Martin Götz and Ernest H. O’Boyle
The overall goal of science is to build a valid and reliable body of knowledge about the functioning of the world and how applying that knowledge can change it. As personnel and…
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The overall goal of science is to build a valid and reliable body of knowledge about the functioning of the world and how applying that knowledge can change it. As personnel and human resources management researchers, we aim to contribute to the respective bodies of knowledge to provide both employers and employees with a workable foundation to help with those problems they are confronted with. However, what research on research has consistently demonstrated is that the scientific endeavor possesses existential issues including a substantial lack of (a) solid theory, (b) replicability, (c) reproducibility, (d) proper and generalizable samples, (e) sufficient quality control (i.e., peer review), (f) robust and trustworthy statistical results, (g) availability of research, and (h) sufficient practical implications. In this chapter, we first sing a song of sorrow regarding the current state of the social sciences in general and personnel and human resources management specifically. Then, we investigate potential grievances that might have led to it (i.e., questionable research practices, misplaced incentives), only to end with a verse of hope by outlining an avenue for betterment (i.e., open science and policy changes at multiple levels).
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Virginia Vannucci and Eleonora Pantano
Upon reading this chapter, the reader will understand
- How consumers perceive a privacy loss when exposed to retailers' big data analytics
- The role played by the social environment…
Abstract
Learning Outcomes
Upon reading this chapter, the reader will understand
How consumers perceive a privacy loss when exposed to retailers' big data analytics
The role played by the social environment in terms of the opinions of relatives and friends largely influence how youth perceive the risk of privacy loss
What makes the information about retailers' usage of data not entirely accessible by consumers
Consumers perception of retailers' usage of their data
How consumers perceive a privacy loss when exposed to retailers' big data analytics
The role played by the social environment in terms of the opinions of relatives and friends largely influence how youth perceive the risk of privacy loss
What makes the information about retailers' usage of data not entirely accessible by consumers
Consumers perception of retailers' usage of their data
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Agency theory starts with the assumption that people act in their own self‐interest, and holds that under normal conditions, the goals, interests, and risks of two actors…
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Agency theory starts with the assumption that people act in their own self‐interest, and holds that under normal conditions, the goals, interests, and risks of two actors (principal and agent) are not identical. This means that the agent will not necessarily act according to the interests of the principal. CEO compensation is the type of control mechanism that companies employ to reduce the agency problem. This paper took 201 manufacturing companies in the year 1998 in Taiwan, and used the LISTREL 8 model to analyze the influence of company performance, scale, and board of director control over CEO compensation. The results indicate is that company performance, scale, and control by the board of directors all influence CEO compensation, with company scale the main factor, followed by company performance, and control by the board of directors. I also find that CEO compensation is higher when the board of directors' does not have effective control. Moreover, the board of directors control of a company is diminished when the CTO and chairman of the board are one person, and also when the number of internal directors is great. Conversely, the board of directors' control is increased when their ratio of stock ownership is higher.
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